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Paddon: HMS <em>Prince of Wales</em> and HMS <em>Warspite</em>

With HMS Prince of Wales
and HMS Warspite
The Adventures of a Canadian Radar
Officer in the Royal Navy
Stuart E. Paddon
l l ]hen the war was declared in 1939, I was in
VV Noranda, Quebec, in a gold and copper

"R" Class battleship. We arrived in Portsmouth
in early May 1946.

mine. I came back from there in September to
complete my final year in Physics at the
University of Western Ontario. We had just
started the University year when we were
approached by the head of the Physics
department to see if we were agreeable to having
our syllabus altered to give emphasis to
electronics. If you recall in those days electronics,
certainly at Western, was a post-grad course, not
an undergrad course. We agreed.

As far as I know we were the first group of
Canadians to hit the Portsmouth Royal Naval
Barracks. Then radar was not called radar, it
was called RDF. The term radar did not come
into play until the Americans got involved. In
any case we had a very short course to acquaint
us with the principles of radar, which term I will
use.

This request had really originated with the
Royal Navy, who had been unable to find any
electronic talent at home because, I gather, all of
it had been bought up by the RAF. The RN
appealed to the Royal Canadian Navy, who in
turn approached the National Research Council.
Things proceeded as one might expect, until
somewhere about February 1940. I then met the
first naval officer I had ever seen, one LieutenantCommander Finch-Noyes. He made it known to
us that in a relatively short time we would be
proceeding to serve with the Royal Navy in certain
not very clear duties. There appeared to be a
great deal of secrecy involved. In April we were
asked to go to HMCS Prevost in London where
we were attested, I believe my date was the 24th
of April and I became an acting sublieutenant,
temporary while holding on, gasping for breath,
in the RCNVR.
We crossed the Atlantic in a Castle Class
Ship, the name I can't recall, but I do recall that
the warship escorting us was the Revenge, an
90

By the end of June people then began to
disperse to various ships. I was informed that I
would be going to HMS Prince of Wales, but she
was not to be commissioned until January 1941
and there would be no requirement for me to
stand by the ship much before November 1940.
About mid-August I became one of several
radar officers who acted as officer of a watch in
the only naval radar station in the Battle of
Britain chain, the remainder being manned by
Air Force.
The following month I asked to get some seatime because I had never served in any warship
of any shape or size. The powers-that-be decided
to send me to HMS Dido, a 5.25 cruiser, roughly
6,000 tons, which was just completing
construction at Camel Laird's Shipyards in the
Mersey across from Liverpool. The Canadian
who was the radar officer of this ship was my
ex-Western friend Maurice Hartley; he received
the first 281 radar that had been put together.
Upon commissioning we sailed up to Scapa Flow
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and commenced fairly elaborate evaluation trials
of the radar. Four Royal Navy civilian scientists
were aboard to determine what trials were
conducted and to take results.
At the end of this period Hartley wrote a
scathing report of the type 281 radar, which his
Captain should never have allowed to be
dispatched from the ship, in the verbiage that
was used; however, the fifteen or twenty
recommendations that were the meat of the
report were incorporated in later versions of the
281 over the next couple of years. But the report
was so scathing that the Commanding Officer of
Signal School hauled Hartley down to

been to sea before. I was the only technician;
there were no technicians trained at that time in
the Royal Navy for radar duties. Needless to say
I found myself with my head inside a radar set
almost continuously with maybe 40% of the sets
not functioning at any one moment. Right from
the outset I decided the type 281 would receive
top priority, the gunnery sets would follow as
best they could, with type 282s having the lowest
priority. I didn't receive much direction because
in those days nobody really knew much about
radar and you found two things happen: one,
you had to convince somebody it was worth
carrying and when that was achieved, you had
to convince them that it couldn't tell you what

HMS Prince of Wales

Portsmouth and raked him over the coals for
the language used. I blame Dido's Captain for
allowing it to go out of the ship without
appropriate editing.
I left Dido some time in early November for
Camel Laird's shipyards, there taking up lodging
at the little hotel at the ferry, across from
Liverpool while standing by the Prince of Wales
which was now nearing completion.

The Prince of Wales was the first ship to get
a multiple suit of radar. Up until this time ships
carried one radar, now I was to get ten as follows:
one type 281 radar, air warning principally, with
a capability for surface detection as well; and
nine gunnery radars, type 284 to control the
main 14-inch armament, four 285s to control
the HAlLA 5.25 directors, four 282s for mounting
on the pompom directors. During the ensuing
period I received 30 personnel, one of whom had

kind of cigarettes a pilot was smoking when he
was flying an aircraft.
The ship commissioned about the 15th of
January 1941. Two or three days before the ship
was to commission we were attacked and so
much damage was done to the harbour basin
where the ship was anchored that we had
difficulty getting her clear of the basin. We sailed
to Scapa Flow carrying with us some fifty
dockyard maties; I had one civilian scientist from
HM Signal School as my specialist aboard ship.
The ship, being what it was, was a showpiece
and there were trials officers of ever description
from all quarters and all branches inundating
the wardroom at all times. One could not be sure
who was a ship's officer and who was not a ship's
officer.
To illustrate this, one day at lunchtime I sat
down beside a Commander (remember I was a
91
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Left: HMS Hood
Above: Bismarck

off his monkey jacket, arranged these two chairs
in such a way that they were both in their normal
position about four to six feet apart. He went to
the end of the anteroom. He made a flip in the
air off the first one and landed seated in the
second one, picked up his jacket, walked out of
the anteroom saying, "They used to call me
"Tarzan." Needless to say the Executive Officer
sold himself completely to us on his first testing.
Unfortunately, he was later lost when the ship
was sunk. But he was one of the finest naval
officers I have ever had the pleasure of serving
with because he did everything in just the right
proportions.
Our workups and test exercises were fairly
extensive but we had had only one main
armament shoot, when about May 22 Hood and
ourselves had to proceed to sea to intercept the
Bismarck, being shadowed with radar by Norfolk
and Suffolk, two county class cruisers. Our
Captain came on the PA system and told the
ship's company that he anticipated intercepting
the Bismarck at roughly six a.m. on the 24th of
May, some thirty hours away.
young sublieutenant) - and said to him, "Good
morning, sir. Are you up for the trials?" He
replied, "No. I'm your new Executive Officer. Who
are you?" I answered, "My name's Paddon, sir.
I'm the RDF officer." He said, "Well, I expect we'll
get to know one another". This happened even
quicker than he might have thought, because that
night an engineer sublieutenant by the name of
Tim Healey, who used to play rugger for the Navy,
and I decided we would test out the new
Executive Officer. In the anteroom, as distinct to
the wardroom, we set up two chairs, one with
its seat vertical and one in its normal position. I
went to the far end of the wardroom and hurtled
down the course, feet first over the first chair,
caught the second one with my bottom in the
seat causing it to end up in the upright position
with me seated in it. This had the desired effect.
Our Executive Officer stood up, walked over, took

At exactly six a.m. on the 24th of May we
encountered the Bismarck at 26,000 yards,
roughly thirteen nautical miles, twenty degrees
to starboard. The Flag Officer was in Hood and
we proceeded in line-ahead with Hood leading.
The Hood was a battlecruiser, without the
armour plating which the Prince of Wales
enjoyed. We were doing roughly thirty knots and
opened fire at 26,000 yards.
My position was in the 281 receiving office
and I personally manned the display tube. In
those days we had no gyro repeats; we had to
give bearings by red or green, but we did have
M-type transmission units, little counterdrums
on which we could transmit range. The
transmission counterdrum that I controlled had
as its counterpart a receiver on the wall of the
Transmitting Station, the TS. This had to be read
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and placed by someone into the calculations
which were being carried out on the plot.
Unfortunately, despite the fact that I transmitted
these ranges, no one even knew they were coming
in on the counterdrum and no radar ranges were
used by our gunnery people. We had had only
one previous shoot, and had not developed any
drill. This was unfortunate because I had three
distinct echoes of three ships at 26,000 yards,
clearly portrayed on the radar screen and A-scan
with a linear blip. I was able to follow them in
with complete accuracy and complete detail,
religiously giving the range as I have described.
The third ship turned out later, on investigation,
to have been a supply vessel in company with
the Bismarck and the Prince Eugen. I have never
seen any reference to this supply vessel in
anything I have subsequently read.
There are many interesting features, some
of which I can recount from personal experience,
some only from accounts from fellow officers,
as I was in an enclosed office did not see the
Bismarck. A good friend of mine was a HA
Director Control Officer and he watched the
engagement from his station. Since he was not
being used at this particular time for that range,
he watched five salvoes of Bismarck's fall of shot;
the first was roughly a hundred yards beyond
the Hood, the second was a straddle of Hood,
with the third he saw a fire occur on Hood, the
fourth he did not detect and on the fifth Hood
blew, just exploded. Bits of her fell on our deck.
He watched the foretop, the whole mast
structure, go hurtling through the air for a great
distance. Only three survivors were picked up
by escorting ships.
Here the fallacy of our Admiral is indicated,
as far as I am concerned. The range for Prince of
Wales was almost identical with Hood, and
Bismarck was able immediately to turn her fire
on us, causing severe damage. Our whole
compass platform was shot away and of the ten
or so personnel normally stationed on the
Compass Platform, seven were killed; the three
most important people surviving, the Captain,
the navigator and the Cox'n. A number of our
Air Defence people were killed.
An interesting story is that Esmond Knight,
the actor, was an RNR lieutenant who was a
shipmate and was an Air Defence Officer. He was
seriously injured, losing one eye and badly

damaging the second. Several days later we
dropped him off at Iceland thinking he would
not live. Many years later he appeared in many
shows including "Henry the Eighth" and he was
the actor who portrayed the Captain of the Prince
of Wales in the movie "The Bismarck."
The Prince of Wales continued to engage the
Bismarck for twenty minutes before our Y turret

seized by jamming of the loading trays so that
the turret could not be trained. We did manage
to fire a good number of rounds at Bismarck
and we subsequently found through other
accounts that damage was done to Bismarck,
seriously disrupting her control of armament.
That engagement in which Hood was sunk
lasted twenty minutes and the plot shows that
we broke action with Bismarck and that both
ships proceeded on a parallel course at roughly
fifteen miles separation. As stated we had
suffered severe damage to our Compass
Platform. In my own case, I lost five of my
personnel in the after 285 radar office who were
killed when an 8" shell exploded there. I well
remember going to the plotting office which was
directly below the compass platform and our
Schoolmaster, the senior plot officer, was
adamantly and religiously plotting the course of
ourselves and accompanying ships with the
blood dripping on the navigational chart from
the compass platform above. That's a gory detail
but it's true. In all we lost fifteen to twenty men
killed and a number injured.
From the radar point of view I think there
were two points worth mentioning. While
operating the 281 I was able to observe the blip
of the sixteen inch shells that were being fired at
us come towards us on the radar screen. Also, a
certain amount of interference occurred. None
of the ships in company had radars of the same
frequency as the 281 on the Prince of Wales, yet
I was able to lock onto radar transmissions of
some kind which I reported to Admiralty. Their
scientists visited the ship later to discuss what I
had seen. Subsequently, the decision was that
Bismarck had some form of radar of comparable
frequency to our 281, which was operating at
86 megacycles.
The damage done to the radar systems was
extensive. As my 281 receiver mast had been
shot away, I was denied the use of 281 as a
93
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surface set or as an air warning set. The after
285 office containing two sets had been seriously
damaged, killing five persons. I was left with a
284 with its antenna mounted on the director
control tower; two 285s mounted on HA/LA
directors, one port, one starboard; and four 282s
which were relatively useless. This becomes
important later when we consider what
happened during the night.
The main problem Prince of Wales had
encountered was that Y turret loading trays had
jammed, preventing it from being trained. Work
commenced on that; we were fortunate in having
some of the dockyard maties on board. By
roughly four o'clock in the afternoon we were
ready to re-engage the Bismarck. We did so for
a number of rounds, but before I go into that I
would like to mention one other happening.
The weather had been worsening very
seriously, with poor visibility occurring most of
the afternoon. We were steaming on a parallel
course, roughly fifteen miles from Bismarck,
when suddenly steaming in the opposite
direction another ship was detected. And all
wheels, all gears, started to turn around to
engage this new target, going 180 degrees in the
opposite direction to the two of us. Just as we
were about to engage and open fire the Gunnery
Officer in the DCT said, "Cease fire. That is the
US Coast Guard vessel, such and such". It
happened that he had been reading the messages
some time during the day, had seen this ship
was in the vicinity and it had steamed right up
between the Bismarck and ourselves, going in
the opposite direction. They probably didn't even
know that they passed between these two ships.
As the day progressed, at about four o'clock,
we did engage Bismarck at roughly thirty
thousand yards. Our maximum range on our
fourteen inch guns was fifteen to twenty miles,
firing two thousand pound (roughly a ton)
projectiles. We had three turrets, with four guns
in A turret, two in B and four in Y. Thus we had
ten 14 inch guns capable of a broadside of ten
tons of metal, every thirty seconds.
When we engaged Bismarck at four o'clock,
she replied, but not at us. She seemed to aim at
either Norfolk or Suffolk, one of the escorting
cruisers, I forget which. And her fall of shot was
well off target. This led us to believe that she

had trouble with her fire control. We were
proceeding with this engagement when we were
suddenly directed to disengage in order that a
flight of torpedo bombers from the aircraft
carrier Victorious (I'm not sure where she was)
might attack. We disengaged and watched some
twelve, fifteen, eighteen Swordfish carry out a
torpedo attack on the Bismarck with fatal results
to them, not to Bismarck. I don't believe any
damage occurred to her from the results of that
attack.
As the afternoon went on the weather got
worse. I kept a watch on the type 284 and the
gunnery people manned the director control
tower and we were tracking Bismarck with the
DCT, which is almost impossible from a
mechanical point of view, because of the very
great weight of the antenna and the director
combined. In the long run we lost Bismarck
during the night.
We were forced to return via Iceland after,
we buried our dead at sea, a very impressive
ceremony, and delivered our wounded to
Rejkavik or was it Valfjord, including Esmond
Knight whom I mentioned earlier. The only other
feature that comes to my mind is that as we
proceeded then to Rosythe for damage repairs,
we were still able to steam at thirty knots,
although we had suffered some damage by an
underwater hit of a sixteen inch projectile, which
had caused us to take in a large volume of water,
the tonnage of which I can now not remember.
During our subsequent refit at Rosythe an
unexploded sixteen inch projectile was found in
one of our underwater spaces and we cleared
the drydock while this suspicious looking animal
was removed from the ship.
As an aftermath to the Bismarck show: I had
mentioned earlier that we had a scientist from
HM Signal School. He and I cleaned out the after
285 office and by that I mean we extracted
portions of people from the equipment. With the
transmitter of one type 285 and appropriate
connections to the antenna and with the receiver
of another 285, we got one system functioning
in the HAlLA 5.25" Control System. It was not a
pleasant task. We had five people distributed
through there. Not a happy memory.
One happier memory is that I was granted
some leave while we were in Rosythe and I took
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HMS

Prince of Wales leaving Placentia, NFLD, after the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting, August 1941.

£52, the pound then being worth $4.4 7 and went
to London for two weeks' leave; at the end of
one week I had one pound left. I came back to
my ship, went down to my cabin and in my bunk
was a body; they were not expecting me. I shook
this body and said, "What the hell are you doing
in my bunk?" A Canadian voice said, "Well Christ!
Who the hell are you?" And I said, ''I'm the guy
who owns this bunk." The body was a Canadian,
Ralph Ripley, who had joined the ship from King
Alfred, while I was away. He became a close and
fast friend but unfortunately he was lost, not
when we were sunk off Malaya, but when
Singapore fell. A fine, fine friend, and he was in
my bunk when I got back from leave in 1941.
During the time we underwent damage
repairs, I got a type 273 radar, a warning set of
ten centimetres wavelength. The antennas were
well up the foremast and the equipment was
directly under them in a housing about the office.
It was maybe ninety to a hundred feet about
water level.

opportunity to see the Canadian Navy at work.
They escorted us into Placentia Harbour.
I have a host of memories of this occasion.
One of these was going over to HMCS
Restigouche to buy some Canadian cigarettes,
which I had been without for too long a period. I
knew none of the Canadian officers, but I was
well received in the Wardroom and asked to join
in a crap game in progress on the deck. The
person at my left turned out to be Franklin
Delano Roosevelt Jr., then a young ensign in the
US Navy. He had been invited to this occasion,
along with his brother who was in the Army, in
order to meet Churchill. I purchased ten
thousand Buckingham cigarettes and this
occupied two huge cartons. I was intending to
call my ship to send a boat when FOR Jr.
suggested that he take me back in the boat
allocated to him. I was duly delivered to my ship
along with my ten thousand cigarettes.
On another occasion, all the officers of the
Prince Q[Wales were introduced to Mr. Roosevelt.

The next event worth mentioning was that
we were very surprised to receive Mr. Winston
Churchill, whom we transported to Placentia
Harbour in Newfoundland, where he met
Roosevelt for what is now called the Atlantic
Charter meeting. We were a private ship, no flag
officer carried; however we had a tremendous
amount of brass present on this occasion: all
the Chiefs of Staff and a myriad of staff officers
who were in Churchill's entourage.
On the approaches to the Canadian area, or
at the time the Newfoundland area, we were met
by three Canadian destroyers. This was my first

He took a particular interest in me because I
was at that time one of only two Canadian officers
in the wardroom, the other being Ralph Ripley.
As a matter of interest, a midshipman, Dick Leir,
was also aboard the ship at that time; he had
joined during the repair period as well.
Each evening during the crossing both going
over to Newfoundland on the way back to the
UK, Churchill would come directly into the
wardroom after deck, over the upper deck to
the bridge structure. At one point, the Sub placed
his hand on Churchill's elbow as if to help him
along, and was told in no uncertain terms, to
keep his hands off him. Mr. Churchill was
95
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perfectly capable of looking after himself. He'd
been to sea before this boy was born and would
he please just lead him up to the bridge.

surfaced at the end of its run and exploded. The
staff concluded that the three detonations which
had been heard were three of these torpedoes.

We finally left Newfoundland and proceeded
back on our own as we could do thirty knots. I
remember very well, at one point, we passed
through a huge convoy of ships, which I would
guess was doing about eight or ten knots, and at
this time Churchill made his famous V sign to
many of the merchant ships as we passed them.
I have seen pictures of him so doing on many
occasions in later years. He finally left us with
his group at Iceland, at Rejkavik. We then
returned to Scapa Flow. I presume he took
passage in some other smaller ship back to
England from Iceland.

The following night at roughly the same time,
the same operator was again on duty. He again
detected the presence of what he classified as a
possible submarine. A plot commenced, however
the Admiral immediately caused the Fleet to take
evasive action, with all ships going in all
directions at great rates. I remember this very
well, because I still argue with Terry Burchell,
whether he or I had the first mention in
dispatches for any of our personnel. The seaman
who had been my operator on the two occasions
was mentioned in a dispatch that this Admiral
made to Admiralty which read something like,
"It has been conclusively proven that this new
device called RDF can be used effectively against
a submarine if that submarine is surfaced." This
message recounted the events of the two nights
and made mention of this operator who had been
at the set at the time. Burchell and I have never
resolved our argument about who was first to
get one of his staff mentioned-in-dispatches.

The Admiralty decided to send Prince of
Wales on a Malta convoy into the Mediterranean
to test it against aircraft attack. We proceeded
to Gibraltar where I bought seven pairs of silk
pyjamas. And among other things, more
importantly I believe, we took the first ten
centimetre radar into the Mediterranean. This
becomes important later as we had occasion to
detect the presence of a submarine in the early
hours of the morning at two or three o'clock on
two consecutive nights. We had the Ark Royal,
Nelson, Prince of Wales, six or eight cruisers,
about twenty destroyers, and we were escorting
fifteen to eighteen merchant ships. On the
occasion I make mention of now, one of my
leading seamen was the 273 operator at two in
the morning. I was safely asleep in my bunk when
he detected (at some fourteen thousand yards)
what he classified as a possible submarine. This
echo was tracked continuously, a very nice plot,
until it entered the ground wave and clutter of
the ships in company. There were suddenly three
explosions. By this time, of course, I had been
routed out of my bunk and I was up in the
plotting office. The Admiral whom we were
carrying was the admiral in charge of the cruiser
squadron, but he was riding with us. He sent a
message off to all twenty or twenty-five
destroyers: "Report the result of your depth
charge attack." By morning all destroyers
reported they had carried out no such attack.
All depth charges were intact - none had been
dropped. The staff then decided that this had
been a submarine and that it had fired three
torpedoes. I was told, though I had no personal
knowledge, that the, Italian torpedo ofthat day,

The Admiralty's wishes were granted. We
were subjected to a series of air attacks, none of
which were massive by any means. Ark Royal's
aircraft were in company. On one occasion when
it was fairly hectic, we had engaged an
approaching enemy aircraft and succeeded in
knocking it down. We rapidly changed target to
another aircraft in close pursuit and
unfortunately we shot down one of Ark Royal's
fighters. If I remember correctly the pilot of the
Ark Royal fighter was rescued, picked up by an
escorting destroyer, but it does show the mix-up
that occurs when you're busy in the middle of
an attack. The only other event of importance
was when Nelson received a torpedo in the bow.
She suffered no real apparent damage, other than
that she had been holed. I believe it was a
submarine torpedo, but on this point I'm not
certain. As far as I am aware, we were able to
deliver the convoy of merchant ships intact to
Malta. We then returned to Scapa Flow.
Again I'm uncertain of my timetable, but I
believe it would be sometime in October 1941
when we were told we would be leaving for
somewhere. Our first port of call after Scapa Flow
was in the Clyde where Admiral Toni Phillips
and his staff of some 20 or 30 officers joined the
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ship. This was the first time we had become a
flagship as such, except for carrying an Admiral
on our Mediterranean Malta cruise. We sailed
immediately. What impressed me was, within the
hour I was called to the Admiral's sea cabin,
introduced to the Admiral who told me that he
wished to visit every radar office in the ship, sit
in the operator's chair and have explained to him
what the operator had to do in each set aboard.
This I did. I have read many criticisms of this
Admiral over ensuing years, but as a first
impression it was very encouraging to me that
he took such an interest that, within an hour of
joining the ship, he took the time to visit every
radar office.
It was not until we were some days out of
the Clyde on our way to the East that we got any
impression of where we were going. Our first port
of call was at Freetown, which was my first
opportunity to see an African port. I must admit
it was a real eye opener to see how some of our
African friends lived. Then we stopped in for a
very pleasant two or three days' stay in Cape
Town, where again the lights were on and the
food was magnificent. We proceeded from Cape
Town to a small island which was a strategic
place for refuelling by the British navy.

We had a pleasant stopover in Colombo in
Ceylon. At the time I did not realize our stay was
abbreviated, presumably by some intelligence I
was not made aware of, and that we left one day
earlier than planned. I recall this because I had
purchased a very, very nice gown for the girl who
later became my wife, but I was unable to pick it
up due to unexpected sailing. However, later I
picked this gown up and interestingly enough it
was being held for me, under the counter in the
store with my name on it. Although the price
had doubled, because at that time there were
many Americans in the area, I still paid what
was agreed upon originally.
We left Ceylon, proceeded to Singapore and
the impressive harbour, although Prince Q[Wales
went to the Dockyard which is a different location
on the island. We were there five or six days
before things began to happen.
This was an upsetting period in a way,
because we found the population there almost
completely unaware that a war was going on. We
visited the Singapore Swimming Club (where I

ran up a small bill, which I don't remember
paying) and the Raffles Hotel. There seemed to
be a complete lack of feeling towards the war.
This was rudely interrupted on quote "December
7th"; I say quote because I do not know how the
International Date Line comes into play. What I
do know is that on the same Sunday that Pearl
Harbour was attacked, Singapore was also
attacked. It was at night and we fired at the
intruding aircraft, without any success, I might
add. The attack was not a severe one, but it did
wake up the local residents a bit.
We sailed the following day and our mission,
it was later revealed, was to sweep into the Gulf
of Siam, to lay waste a large flotilla of transports
which were reported to be in that area. We had
Repulse in company and three escorting
destroyers. Monday and most of Tuesday passed
without any significant event. On the Tuesday
evening just before dark, we detected the
presence of a snooping aircraft which would
come up over the horizon and take a look and
go back down. This was reported, of course, to
the Admiral. This would be as I recall, sevenish
to eightish at night. I believe it would have been
about ten o'clock at night that word was passed
that the Admiral, realizing the presence of a ship,
decided to abandon the mission and return to
Singapore.
We remained at what I would call secondary
degree of readiness, not action stations, but
sufficiently so that I stayed close to my action
station. Some time in the night I was called to
my action station in the office of the 284 radar
which controlled the main armament. I had no
sooner closed up there when it was reported that
a scow or some form of small vessel had been
detected. I assume it had been detected by our
273 radar, but I do not know that for certain. I
have since read in the book called The Battleship
that a squadron of Japanese ships passed us
during the night, at a range of eight or nine miles.
All I can say is I do not believe the navigator
would not have had the 273 radar on. If it was
not functioning I would have heard about it very
quickly. If those ships had been within seven or
eight miles we would have detected them. There
is no question in my mind that they would not
have been detected. I did not know of the
presence of that squadron until about six months
ago, when Admiral Pickford recommended that
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HMS Repulse undergoing refit
at Portsmouth, ca. 1936.

waming radar on and almost immediately we
were under attack by Japanese aircraft. I should
mention that we had received some report that
there had been a landing of Japanese ships,
transports
presumably,
at
some
unpronounceable name up the Malayan Coast
and the Admiral had decided to investigate it.
He flew off the two Walrus, one from the Prince
of Wales and the other from Repulse and sent a
destroyer in to check out this reported landing.
The two Walrus never did return to the ships
but flew back to Singapore. No sign of Japanese
landings was found at the point of inspection.
In the meantime, we were lying offshore, 20
to 25 miles, waiting for the destroyer to join us,
when we suddenly found ourselves under attack.
When I did put the air waming set on, we found
aircraft approaching from something less than
twenty miles. When they broke clear of the land
echoes, there showed in relatively small numbers
in groups of nine or ten per group.

I read the book, The Battleship so this still
remains a mystery in my mind. During the night
the 281 air waming radar had been shut down
by a policy of radar silence.
So Many conflicting things come to my
attention: the same book, The Battleship
mentions that breakfast was served on the Prince
of Wales. I remember vividly that there was no
breakfast served in the wardroom, because
Ralph Ripley and I broke into the wardroom
locker and took out some fruit which resembles
a grapefruit but bigger, about twice the size of a
grapefruit. We went out and stretched out on the
quarterdeck and we were peeling this very large
piece of fruit when I saw an aircraft, high in the
sky above us. This would have been about eightthirty to nine o'clock in the morning of the
Wednesday. Ralph Ripley being the second air
defence officer went to an adjacent phone and
called the bridge to see if they had seen the
aircraft. They reported that it was friendly.
About ten or thereabouts we were suddenly
called to air warning stations, I put the air

My air defence station was on the after part
of the bridge, aft of the air defence control
position, where I watched several attacks of
aircraft come in on us. They concentrated on
Prince Q[Wales initially, without paying too much
attention to Repulse as I remember it. I watched
three torpedoes hit Prince of Wales on the
starboard side, without any apparent effect.
Suddenly there was a very heavy shock in the
ship, as if she had been picked up fifty feet and
then dropped. When we stopped bouncing
around we had a list to port of roughly fifteen
degrees. I now understand that this was one or
possibly two hits on our port shaft and as we
were doing a good speed, the high revolution rate
of the shaft, on being hit by a torpedo, caused a
great deal of destruction in the shaft tunnels.
Most of the engine room and so on, on the port
side was inundated with water and we lost power
throughout most of the ship. This would now be
approximately eleven-thirty.
With the list we had, we were unable to bring
our starboard armament to bear on the low flying
torpedo aircraft that were coming in from the
starboard side so we were powerless to do much
of anything.
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At some point during this period when we
were unable to combat the enemy, I was detailed
along with Ralph Ripley, the other Canadian, the
assistant air defence officer, to accompany the
Captain, John Leech, on a tour of the ship, aft.
We arrived at the cinema flat, the largest open
area in the ship, directly above the armoured
deck and over the engine room spaces. A large
number of people had been badly wounded by a
bomb which had detonated on this deck where
all the engine room personnel and so on had
congregated after the torpedo had hit at an earlier
point. Then the Captain returned to the upper
deck, to the base of the bridge structure. He
turned to Ripley and me and said, "Gather some
men together and prepare some Carley floats in
case of abandon ship".
Our Carley floats were attached to the bridge
structure at various points, and our task was to
get them free and ready for use. The Captain
went back to his post on the Compass Platform.
Earlier, before the Captain and Ripley and I
toured the ship, I had watched the Repulse sink.
At the beginning of the engagement the Japanese
had paid the greatest attention to Prince qfWales.
When they found that they had pretty well put
us out of action, they then turned a very
concentrated effort on Repulse. At the time I was
standing near the signal deck of the after part of
the bridge structure and watched about eight or
nine torpedo bombers approach Repulse from
the stern. Repulse was still doing a good speed
and I later heard that Captain Tennant managed
to avoid seventeen or eighteen torpedoes, before
the ship was hit. However, while I watched, the
ship, in an attempt to avoid an attack which was
then being carried out on her, made a turn to
starboard from which she never recovered. As
she went into the starboard turn she continued
to move forward, went over on her starboard
side and when I saw her last, her props were
still turning, actually turning as she disappeared.
Her sinking was in great contrast to ours.
Repulse went down so quickly that her loss of

life was very great, much higher than we
sustained. She sank at twelve-thirty, Prince oj
Wales sat for about an hour or so later and sank
at one-twenty. During this interval we remained
at this heavy list to port.

Mter making the tour with the Captain and
while the ship remained at this very difficult list,
I was carrying out the procedure of freeing Carley
floats. Then the ship suddenly heaved up very
rapidly and it was clear to everyone that this
was it. She went down, rolling very rapidly to
port.
I was on the starboard side of the big bridge
structure, with the ship going very rapidly to port.
The only thing I could do was scramble. I tried
three times to climb the deck towards the
starboard side and get off that side. On each
occasion I slid back on the deck into the Bridge
structure. I finally realized I couldn't get off the
starboard side. Although my mind is confused,
I remember sliding down what was probably one
of the stays for the foremast. By the way, while I
was scrambling I was probably the last to see
both John Leech, our Captain, and the Admiral,
"Tom Thumb" Phillips, because I saw the two of
them attempting to get out of the hatch, in the
deckhead of the Compass Platform. The two of
them were climbing or trying to climb through
that hatch, whilst I was trying to make my way
over to the port side of the ship.
I was one of very few who managed to escape
the ship by going over the port side, or what had
been the port side, probably more likely part of
the mast structure. In any case, at some point I
saw clear water below and I dove. I was wearing
a Mae West. For a moment I seemed to be
entangled briefly by something around my foot,
which I managed to kick free. I popped up and
swam very rapidly. Finally I came across an
emergency biscuit package ration from one of
the ship's boats. I put my arm over this and
looked around, there was no ship. It was gone. I
was lucky not to have been sucked down by the
ship itself.
Later on I managed to get to a catamaran,
which had broken free from the ship. There were
three or four others, one of whom was
Commander Brown, the Staff Gunnery Officer
on the Admiral's Staff. A number of us clambered
up on this catamaran and sat there and watched
the Japanese aircraft that were still above,
watching destroyers moving, picking up
survivors.
Some thing I should have mentioned earlier
was that, the destroyer HMS Express was able
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to come alongside the after portion of the
quarterdeck of Prince of Wales before she sank
and many of the battleship's crew were able to
move from her quarterdeck directly onto the
focs'l of Express. Now this destroyer was so
close, that when Prince of Wales actually turned
over and went rapidly down, the stem or bow of
Express caught momentarily on the sinking ship
as she turned. Fortunately the CO was able to
back off and free this destroyer and get clear.
But something like five or six hundred of Prince
of Wales personnel managed to transfer directly
from deck to deck.
In my case, I remained in the water, I
suppose, an hour and a half. During this period
the Japanese aircraft did not make any attempt
to bother the two destroyers picking up
survivors, the third destroyer having left us some
time that morning.
I saw my only friendly aircraft, a Brewster
Buffalo, fly over while I was sitting in the water
and I'm not sure that we waved hilariously at
him at this point. I saw some reference in the
book Battleship about raucous comments but I
don't think any of that happened. I was not
picked up by the Express, I was picked up by
the Electra which, in the main, picked up
survivors from the Repulse. Something like 800
personnel were aboard the Electra, and after she
had picked up all the survivors that could be
found, we proceeded back to Singapore where
we were greeted by the shore staff.
In Singapore there was suddenly available
to the authorities additional personnel from our
survivors. Many of the officers were given special
jobs; my friend Ripley was put in charge of a
small boat, probably a patrol vessel of some kind
in which he spent the next two or three weeks or
longer going up the Malayan Coast and
infiltrating personnel and ammunition behind
Japanese lines. He and other officers from Prince
qfWales and Repulse were engaged in this work.
One day I was in the Headquarters building
and stood smartly aside to allow the Admiral to
go by, when he looked at me and said, "Come
into my office." I followed and he said, "I've got
just the job for a young fellow like you," and then,
almost immediately, "What is that green stripe
for?'' I said, "I was the radar officer of the Prince

of Wales, Sir." He said, "Oh, you will not be able
to do this job then." And I was dismissed.
Soonafter I was transfered to Colombo,
Ceylon where my job as Port Radar Officer at
was very easy. I had a Petty Officer Technician,
the frrst of his kind that I had ever seen. Although
he had come from some ship, he had not been
with us in the Singapore episode. Whenever a
ship that had any radar came into port, the PO
and I would go aboard to check whether they
had any problems that required assistance. He
would take the type 286, which was the set the
destroyers were then carrying, and check it out.
Some of the destroyers had a 285 by this time,
and I'd check that out as I had had a lot of
experience on that type of equipment. After
roughly an hour's time, I would adjourn to the
Wardroom, have a noggin with the ship's officers,
and if there were no other ships coming in that
day I would proceed to the golf course where I
was an honourary and, I hope, also an
honourable member. It cost me nothing and I
enjoyed that Royal Colombo Golf course very
much.
Among the things that happened when I was
in Colombo, was that the Royal Sovereign was
there and for the first time I met Bob Battles, its
radar officer and a Canadian. Bob was having
difficulty with his 284 Surface Gunnery Radar.
Between us we refitted the whole antenna, a great
big trough, with dozens of dipole elements in it.
My stay in Ceylon was rudely interrupted one
Sunday morning as I was having a late breakfast.
The Fleet Signal Officer came in and said,
"Paddon, get your gear together," of which I had
none by the way, "and you will join Warspite this
afternoon at two o'clock." Warspite, after having
been severely damaged at Crete, had proceeded
to Bremerton Shipyard in the Pacific, in
Washington State and was refitted. Among other
things, she was supposed to have received some
new radar, including two 285s, a 282, a 284,
and a 273. The five sets as I recall.
At two o'clock that Sunday afternoon, I joined
Warspite, 20 seconds after Admiral Sommerville
joined. Sommerville was, if you recall,
Commander Force "H," operating out of Gibraltar
earlier in the war. There are many stories of him
and Admiral Cunningham in their exchange of
messages with biblical quotations. He was now
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Flag Officer, Pacific Fleet, and Warspite his
flagship. We had no sooner joined, he twenty
seconds ahead of me, than I, being something I
had never been before, Staff Officer on the
Admiral's Staff, decided that I should go to the
Admiral's bridge. As I'd never even been on the
ship before, I wasn't even sure where that was.
Anyway I got up on the after part of the Bridge,
as soon as I was aboard. We sailed and I suddenly
saw a long face with a brass hat turn around
and look at me and say, "You, come here." So
over I went. "Yes, Sir." "Who are you?" "Well I'm
your radar officer, Sir." "What's your name?"
"Paddon, Sir." Then as we were leaving harbour,
he looked at Illustrious, or it might have been
Formidable, and said, "What kind of
interrogation equipment has Illustrious?" But he
called the ship by its incorrect name, the ship
he named was at Trincomalee. Now the answer
was significant. The 281 s required an
interrogator, which was a 242. The 279s which
Illustrious carried did not require an
interrogator; it did its own interrogation by its
propagation frequency. What do you tell an
admiral: that he is calling a ship by its wrong
name? Or do you try to explain the complexities
of radar to him? At this point I don't remember
what the hell I did but he appreciated me from
then on because very shortly afterwards he found
that I was the only one who knew the difference
between Ramilles, Royal Sovereign, Revenge
and the fourth "R," Resolution, because of some
little differences in their radar suites. As I was
the only one who could pick it out time after
time, I would be called up by the Bridge and the
Admiral would say, "Paddon which one of the
"R" class battleships is that one over there?" I
would look across at the suite of radar and say,
"That's the Ramilles, Sir." I was at least useful
on some occasions.
The Fleet at this time consisted of the Flag
Ship Warspite and the four "R" class battleships,
three aircraft carriers Illustrious, Formidable
and one other, with something like 20 percent
complement of aircraft. A number of cruisers
and a variety of destroyers, some 30 ships
probably in all.
We were at sea for a week maybe, when the
attack on Ceylon occurred. We got some warning
of this but I'm not sure how. The Admiral sent
off a search flight from one of the carriers, which
was able to report back that the strength of the

enemy was formidable. I must admit that this
being my first time at sea after having just been
sunk, I was very pleased when discretion became
the better part of valour, and the Admiral decided
to take his whole Fleet up to Bombay where we
spent eight delightful days.
Before this happened Cornwall and
Dorsetshire, who had been in Colombo with us,

were ordered to join the Fleet, and it was during
their approach to join us, that they were sunk
by Japanese aircraft. As a matter of fact, on the
281 in Warspite, we watched the aerial activity
over the ships, during the time of their sinking.
An interesting by-product. Again the radar
officer of the Cornwall was a Canadian, who's
name escapes me. I met him back in Colombo
weeks later, and he said that the two ships were
sunk in less than ten minutes by the Japanese
aircraft. He also mentioned that when they had
sunk the two ships, the formations of Japanese
aircraft formed up and dipped and saluted the
survivors in the water. They did not fire at them
which was the same as my own experience with
the Prince of Wales when we were sunk. This
type of story is in such contrast to the horror
stories one heard of the Japanese Army that I
think it is worth mentioning. Maybe there was a
different ethic in the Japanese Navy.
Of many events in the happening in the
Indian Ocean, one that comes to mind, is when
the decision was made to take over Madagascar
from the Vichy French. This was an unbelievable
sight, a vast armada of merchant craft with
Commandos. All the strength of the Far East
Fleet, including the aircraft carriers and Warspite
and all the "R" class battleships assembled one
morning one mile off a little village called
Tamatave, which is about half-way down the
coast of Madagascar. Other ships had moved into
the beautiful harbour of Diego Suarez and had
landed and taken possession of the harbour,
which is one of the most beautiful harbours in
the world. On this morning of the so-called Battle
ofTamatave, we sailed up and down about one
mile off the shore. Apparently we had all the
information on gun emplacements and where
they were located and each of the ships had been
given appropriate targets. The Admiral was very
much inclined not to bombard. He sent an envoy
ashore to say, "If you do not surrender within
twenty minutes, I will be forced to open fire."
101

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss2/11

12

Paddon: HMS <em>Prince of Wales</em> and HMS <em>Warspite</em>

HMS Warspite, November 1942.

Twenty minutes after the envoy had returned the
French had not surrendered. The Admiral sent
the envoy ashore again and said, "If you do not
surrender within twenty minutes, I will open fire
this time." The time, of course, passed by and
still the French did not surrender. Just at that
moment when the morning watch was turning
over to the forenoon watch and gunlayer A was
not in his seat, the French fired one shot. Of
course, none of Warspite's guncrew were in a
position to fire at this moment, but as soon as
the French had fired the one shot, a myriad of
white flags went up ashore and they surrendered.
That was the battle ofTamatave. One shot was
fired by them and that was all.

The other most significant event that
occurred in this period in the Indian Ocean is
that I was promoted to the very senior rank of
Lieutenant, I think it was the 24th of April1942.
Somewhere around November 1942 or
thereabouts I was informed that I would be
relieved and returned to Canada before long.
That was a very vague timing. As a matter of
fact, I finally left the ship in early January of
1943 at Durban in South Mrica.
Rear-Admiral Stuart Edmund Paddon was
born in October 1917 in St. Thomas,
Ontario. Following the events described in
this article, Paddon served in the signals
directorate at Naval Service Headquarters in
Ottawa and was demobilized in 1945.
Paddon joined the regular navy as a
lieutenant in June 1946. Apart from two
years as electrical officer aboard HMCS
Ontario, Paddon spent the balance of his
career as a staff officer at shore bases,
retiring at the rank of rear-admiral in July
1972. He passed away in November 1989 at
the age of 72.

This article has been adapted from the original
version printed in Salty Dips, Volume 1, 1983.
It has been reproduced with the permission of
the Naval Officers' Association of Canada, Ottawa
Branch.
Special thanks to Ken Macpherson for providing
the ship photos.
Captain S.E. Paddon, May 1961.
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